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Abstract
Leading up to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV) sought
to tamp down inflation by raising its interest rate target and by raising the marginal reserve
requirement for banks, which it had introduced in 2006. By late 2008, the GFC began to hit
Venezuelan banks and the country’s public oil producer (PDVSA). Widespread deposit
withdrawals squeezed banks and pushed the interbank lending rate to 28%. The BCV
responded in December 2008 by lowering the marginal reserve requirement, applicable to
deposits above 90 billion bolívars (USD 4.2 million), from 30% to 27% of deposits. It held
the minimum cash reserve requirement at 17%. The global recession also cut into the
revenue of PDVSA, the country’s biggest exporter. To free up bank liquidity for the purchase
of PDVSA bonds and stimulate the economy, the BCV cut the marginal requirement three
times between June and October 2010, setting it equal to the minimum requirement of 17%.
The first cut in the marginal reserve requirement, from 30% to 27%, released VEF 6 billion
(USD 2.8 billion) of liquidity into the financial system.
Keywords: Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV), liquidity rules, marginal requirement, PDVSA
reserve ratio, reserve requirements

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the adjustment of reserve requirements. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial
Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Overview
In the years leading to the Global Financial
Crisis (GFC), monetary policy in Venezuela
focused on countering inflation with high
interest rates, the absorption of liquidity
from the banking sector, and a higher
marginal reserve requirement ratio—a tool
the Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV)
introduced in 2006 (Arreaza-Coll, Huskey,
and Zumeta 2009; Leonard 2012).
Insulated by low foreign ownership and
successful attempts to de-dollarize the
banking system, Venezuelan banks were
spared from the intense, sudden credit
crunches that seized its neighbors.
However, falling oil revenue caused by the
GFC manifested in late 2008 as declining
public-sector deposits. The public deposit
base shrank by 55% at some small
institutions, and interbank lending doubled
in fall 2008, forcing interbank lending rates
up from 9% to 28% by December.
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2009). The
BCV, which had previously tried to inject
liquidity directly by accepting government
bonds and notes from banks in exchange
for cash, announced on December 30, 2008,
that it would lower the marginal reserve
requirement from 30% to 27% of net
obligations (Dow Jones 2007b; Economist
Intelligence Unit 2009; Gaceta Oficial 2008,
sec. 15).

Key Terms
Purpose of Adjusting Reserve Requirement (RR): to
increase liquidity in the banking sector
Range of RR Ratio
(RRR) Peak-toTrough

30.0%–17.0%

RRR Increase Period

July 2006

RRR Decrease
Period

December 2008–
October 2010

Legal Authority

Law of the BCV

Interest/
Remuneration on
Reserves

Unremunerated

Notable Features

Timed before government
bond issues
Covered a broad population
of banks and nonbank
financial institutions,
including money-market
funds

Outcomes

VEF 6 billion (USD 2.8
billion) liquidity released in
the cut from 30% to 27%

At the time, Venezuela’s reserve management system consisted of deposits held in bolívars
at the BCV. The central bank computed holdings as the average of daily holdings over each
business week (Gaceta Oficial 2007, secs. 1, 3). A minimum requirement of 17% applied to
all deposits, and a marginal requirement applied to deposits above 90 billion bolívars (USD
4.2 million) (Dow Jones 2007a; Gaceta Oficial 2007, secs. 13–15). Financial institutions held
requirements against the Net Obligations Base, which consisted of most obligations except
funds due to the BCV, the national government, and export finance companies (Gaceta Oficial
2007, sec. 13). The 17% reserve requirement for foreign currency obligations was also held
in bolívars, with the BCV computing the conversion into respective foreign currencies. In
conjunction with other tools, high reserve requirements effectively de-dollarized the
Venezuelan deposit base as of 1999 (Arreaza-Coll, Huskey, and Zumeta 2009; Galindo and
Leiderman 2005; Yeyati 2021).
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Recessionary conditions squeezed bank liquidity further in 2009, and the deposit base
shrank.3 The BCV cut the marginal reserve requirement three more times, setting the rate at
23% on November 30 (Gaceta Oficial 2009b, sec. 15). The BCV did not change the marginal
rate again until 2010. The minimum requirement remained at 17% throughout the crisis.
In 2009, the government also closed at least seven banks. Officially, these banks failed to
meet reserve requirements or capital requirements, but international media reports also
point to the banks’ improper practices and to the possible political motivations of the
administration of President Hugo Chávez (Economist Intelligence Unit 2010; Smith 2009).
Some of these closures were due to the shutdown of the permuta market, which used
government bonds as a medium to exchange dollars and bolívars. In its place, the
administration created a bond-trading exchange run by the BCV that limited the amount of
dollars entering Venezuela (The Economist 2010). As a result, individual government bond
issues became more important for obtaining the dollars necessary for global trade at the
same time the government needed bond financing to cushion the fall in oil revenue.
Ahead of a USD 3 billion Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) bond issue in October 2010, the
BCV lowered the marginal reserve requirement from 23% to 20% (Gaceta Oficial 2010a, sec.
15). As a national company and large bond issuer, PDVSA bonds were important to the bondtrading exchange. A week later, after the issue, the BCV lowered the requirement again, to
17%, matching the minimum reserve requirement (Gaceta Oficial 2010b, sec. 15). The BCV
highlighted the importance of the bond issue and said in both cases that the changes were
aimed at increasing bank liquidity (Reuters News 2010).
Summary Evaluation
Research did not discover any evaluations of the changes to Venezuelan reserve
requirements. Following the changes, real deposits in Venezuelan banks climbed to their
highest levels since 1999, in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP (Yeyati 2021, figs.
25, 28). The first cut in the marginal reserve requirement, from 30% to 27%, released VEF 6
billion (USD 2.8 billion) of liquidity into the financial system (Economist Intelligence Unit
2009).

3 In 2008, the

BCV replaced the bolívar (VEB) with the bolívar fuerte (VEF), at a rate of VEF 1 = VEB 1,000. Until
January 2010, the official exchange rate was fixed at VEF 2.14 = USD 1; until the end of reserve-requirement
changes, the official exchange rate doubled to VEF 4.29 = USD 1 (Fed 1995). The black market rate, for which
data exists since June 23, 2010, averaged VEF 8.16 = USD 1 until October 26, 2010, the last decrease in the
marginal reserve requirement (DolarToday 2010).
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The BCV lowered reserve requirements to increase bank liquidity and
then stimulate economic activity.
The BCV did not state any purpose for cutting the marginal reserve requirements on
December 30, 2008. Two years later, after the BCV again cut the requirement, the Venezuelan
press reported that the BCV’s motivation was to increase bank liquidity and combat the
economic recession (Business News Americas 2010a; Business News Americas 2010b).
A February 2009 news article explained the December 2008 cut by noting that the
Venezuelan banking sector faced withdrawals by the government due to election spending
and Christmas bonuses. In all, deposits in public-sector banks fell 10.2% between September
and November 2008, and small banks registered withdrawals as high as 55%. Interbank
lending more than doubled in fall 2008, forcing the interbank rate up from 9% to 33%
between October 2008 and January 2009 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2009).
The country faced an economic slide in 2009 and 2010, with real GDP contracting by 1.5%,
the only Latin American economy to shrink in 2010. Flagging oil production and associated
revenue strained the finances of PDVSA and the government. The government established a
bond-trading system administered by the BCV in which participants could exchange bonds
issued by PDVSA or the government at a rate of 1 US dollar to 5.3 bolívars. Issuance of
government and PDVSA bonds thus became critical to financial markets, since the only
alternative source for dollars was the black market, which sold dollars at a rate of 9 bolívars
(The Economist 2010).
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Figure 1: Deposits in Commercial, Universal, and Development Banks in December
2007 (in bolívars)

Source: Yeyati 2021, fig. 25.
2. Part of a Package: It is unclear how connected the changes to reserve
requirements and other crisis-fighting actions were.
Following the first cut of marginal reserve requirements in December 2008, the BCV also
provided liquidity and capital to banks in need by accepting government bonds and notes
from banks in exchange for cash, beginning in February 2009 (Dow Jones 2007b; Economist
Intelligence Unit 2009). A month later, the BCV cut the marginal reserve requirement to 25%.
In May 2008, the government forced banks to sell USD 5 billion of foreign-issued, USD-linked
notes and buy bolívars. Venezuelan banks had purchased these notes to skirt a regulation
limiting banks’ holdings of foreign currency assets to 30% of assets; the forced sale of these
notes saddled banks with large losses and raised concerns about their solvency (Reuters
2008; Romero 2008). In June 2008, the government eliminated a tax on bank withdrawals
(Leonard 2012). In July 2008, global oil prices fell dramatically, hurting Venezuela’s
dominant industry, already weak from lingering effects of labor strikes that began in 2003
(Millard et al. 2019). Later that month, following a year of efforts to nationalize more firms
in the country, the Chávez administration announced the government would take over Banco
de Venezuela, the country’s third-largest bank, which was owned by Santander, a large
Spanish bank (Romero 2008).
3. Legal Authority: The Law of the BCV authorized the central bank to set reserve
requirements.
Resolutions published in the official gazette cited articles 21(2), 51, 52, 53, and 55 of the Law
of the BCV (Central Bank Law 2002). Collectively, these articles allowed the BCV Board of
Directors to set reserve requirements and compelled banks to maintain the set amount.
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Article 52 protected reserves from use by declaring them unseizable (inembargables). The
resolutions also drew from a law that regulated banks.4
4. Administration: The BCV administered reserve requirements.
The BCV administered changes to reserve requirements. The Law of the BCV permitted the
BCV to accept sight (demand) and term deposits, noting that demand deposits and reserve
requirements formed the basis of Venezuela’s clearinghouse system (Central Bank Law
2002). According to the Law of the BCV, the central bank could remunerate reserves for
monetary policy purposes under terms and conditions established by the BCV’s Board of
Directors. The BCV established the calculation of the reserve requirement ratio, as well as
the interest rate paid by banks and other financial institutions.
5. Governance: The BCV Board of Directors published a resolution in Venezuela's
legal gazette notifying banks of changes to reserve requirements.
The Board published a resolution in the official gazette whenever it changed the reserve
requirements, which replaced the previous policy at a specified later date.
The Board of Directors consisted of the president of the BCV and six directors. Five of these
directors were appointed for seven-year terms, while the sixth was a current economic
minister other than the minister of finance (Central Bank Law 2002, sec. 15). The president
of Venezuela appointed the BCV president and four directors, while the National Assembly
appointed the remaining two (Central Bank Law 2002, sec. 16).
6. Communication: The BCV conducted press conferences with journalists when
announcing changes to reserve requirements.
News articles demonstrate that officials held conferences when announcing their decisions,
though research found no transcripts of those events (Reuters News 2010).
7. Assets Qualifying as Reserves: Legal tenders held at the BCV were the only assets
that qualified as reserves.
Only bolívars held at the BCV satisfied the reserve requirement (Gaceta Oficial 2007, sec. 6).
8. Reservable Liabilities: The BCV applied the RRR to most obligations.
The BCV did not differentiate deposit obligations by the type of account. The minimum
requirement was 17% of the Net Obligations Reserve Base, a requirement which remained
steady between 2008 and 2010 (BCV 1998). The Net Obligations Reserve Base included all
obligations as of July 14, 2006, except those held in trust or due to (Gaceta Oficial 2007, sec.
1):

4 The law was called el Decreto con Rango, Valor y Fuerza de Ley de Reforma Pacial de la Ley General de

Bancos y Otras Instituciones Financieras (Gaceta Oficial 2007).
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•

the BCV (Gaceta Oficial 2007, sec. 16)

•

the Venezuelan government

•

export finance companies

•

public housing funds (such as el Fondo de Ahorro Obligatorio para la Vivienda;
Gaceta Oficial 2007, sec. 4).

9. Computation: Reserves were held at the BCV, and it is unclear whether the
balances were averaged at the time of RR adjustments during the GFC.
A resolution set forth in December 2021 indicated that the BCV used average end-of-day
balances of banks in its accounts over a business week to calculate reserve holdings
(Planchart 2022). However, it is unclear whether this averaging practice existed before the
December 2021 Resolution and during or before the GFC.
10. Eligible Institutions: All financial institutions, except for the public development
bank, microfinance institutions, and certain foreign exchange-oriented firms,
were subject to reserve requirements.
The legal act creating and amending reserve requirements specified that all the following
were required to hold reserves:
•

Commercial banks

•

Universal banks

•

Investment banks

•

Mortgage banks

•

Financial leasing companies

•

Savings and loan institutions

•

Money-market funds (Gaceta Oficial 2007, secs. 2, 16).

Starting in July 2009, the BCV assigned a 12% RRR to development banks, including those
engaged in microfinance activity, in which 70% of assets were microfinance loans (Gaceta
Oficial 2009a, sec. 16).
Between fall 2009 and spring 2010, the government closed at least 12 banks (Cancel and
Pons 2010). Figure 4 in the Appendix shows how these closures coincided with closures in
the investment-bank and money-market-fund subsectors. These closures were putatively
related to insufficient reserves or capital (nine banks had capital adequacy ratios less than
8% as of October 2008). As shown in Figure 2, banks did face shortages of reserves in late
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2009 and early 2010. But international media reports also point to mismanagement by
bankers: In addition to undercapitalization, “others were apparently lending top executives
large sums of money, and at least one financier couldn’t prove where he got the money to
buy his banks in the first place” (Smith 2009).
Figure 2: Reserve Holdings of Financial Leasing Companies, Universal Banks, Savings
and Loan Institutions, Commercial Banks (clockwise from top left)

Source: BCV 2008.
11. Timing: The BCV lowered marginal reserve requirements after a recession hit
Venezuela’s economy and, in the second set of changes, around large government
bond issues.
In July 2006, the BCV added the marginal reserve requirement for banks, which applied to
deposits above 90 billion bolívars, in an effort to aid smaller banks with total deposits (Dow
Jones 2007a). Once the crisis started in 2008, changes came, first following bank failures and
liquidity shortages, and then around problems in the real economy and government bond
issues. The BCV tried to provide liquidity directly to ailing banks before it lowered reserve
requirements (Economist Intelligence Unit 2009). The second round of changes was
explicitly targeted at a USD 3 billion PDVSA bond issue (Reuters News 2010). PDVSA bonds
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featured prominently in the Venezuelan foreign exchange system, and the oil producer
needed cash acutely in 2010 as recessions abroad reduced oil revenue (The Economist
2010).
On December 30, 2008, the central bank cut the marginal reserve requirement from 30% to
27%, effective January 5, 2009 (Leonard 2012).
12. Changes in Reserve Requirements: The BCV did not differentiate liabilities, and
foreign currency requirements remained fixed.
Between 2008 and 2010, the BCV cut the RRR from 30% to 17% (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Changes to BCV Reserve Requirements

Sources: Gaceta Oficial 2007; Gaceta Oficial 2008; Gaceta Oficial 2009b; Gaceta Oficial 2010a;
Gaceta Oficial 2010b.
Local/Foreign Currency Rates
The foreign currency requirement, which was denominated in bolívars, remained at 17%
between 2008 and 2010 (Gaceta Oficial 2007, sec. 15).
Marginal Requirement
The BCV lowered the marginal requirement, which applied to deposits in excess of 90 million
bolívars, from 30% to 17% between January 2009 and October 2010 (see Figure 3) (Gaceta
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Oficial 2007, sec. 15; Gaceta Oficial 2010b, sec. 15). Five individual changes constituted this
decrease.
13. Changes in Interest/Remuneration: Although the BCV had the authority to
remunerate reserves, no documents suggest that it did.
The Law of the BCV (Central Bank Law 2002, sec. 54) granted the Board of Directors the
authority to remunerate reserves to further its monetary policy. Documents surveyed do not
indicate a rate that the BCV paid, and the resolutions setting reserve requirements do not
mention remuneration.
14. Other Restrictions: No other conditions were attached to the reserve
requirements.
No documents suggest other conditions of lowered reserve requirements.
15. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: The BCV did not take actions to
counteract the impact of reserve requirement changes on monetary policy.
Changes to reserve requirements were not met with any countervailing policies. The BCV’s
other policies were also aimed at increasing banking system liquidity. The BCV lowered
reserve requirements to provide liquidity to the banking sector ahead of the PDVSA bond
issuance, which would remove liquidity from the system (Business News Americas 2010b).
16. Duration: The BCV did not announce when it would revert to its previous reserve
requirements; marginal requirements remained at 17% until 2013.
The BCV gave no indication that reserve requirement changes would be temporary. On the
contrary, in April 2009, a month after the BCV lowered the marginal requirement to 25%,
the Planning and Development minister said that the cash reserve requirement “was already
quite high, not just the reserve requirement but also a second complimentary [sic] level”
(BBC News 2009). Reserve requirements remained at 17% until October 2013, when the
minimum requirement was raised to 19% and the marginal requirement raised to 22% (BCV
1998).
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Appendix
Figure 4: Reserve Holdings of Investment Banks and Money-Market Funds

Source: BCV 2008.
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